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POTHOLES, LAMPPOSTS AND POLICEMEN: EQUAL
PROTECTION AND THE FINANCING OF BASIC
MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN THE WAKE OF
HAWKINS AND SERRANO
The most concrete fact of the ghetto is its physical uglinessthe dirt, the filth, the neglect. In many stores walls are unpainted,
windows are unwashed, service is poor, supplies are meager. The
parks are seedy with lack of care. The streets are crowded with the
people and refuse....
Everywhere there are signs of fantasy, decay,
abandonment, and defeat. The only constant characteristic is a sense
of inadequacy. People seem to have given up in the little things that
are so often the symbol of the larger things.1
[T]he poor always have bad roads whether they live in the city,
in towns or on farms .... 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The inadequacy of basic municipal services in poor and black areas
has been long recognized and little documented. 3 Unlike education, which
is national priority number two in terms of aggregate spending and state
and local government priority number one by any index, 4 municipal serv1. K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 27 (1965).
2. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 11 (Penguin ed. 1962).
3. See Ratner, Inter-NeighborhoodDenials of Equal Protection in the Provision
of Municipal Services, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LrB. L. REV. 1 (1968). The documentation of these inadequacies can be effectively accomplished only at the local level.
See, e.g., the documentation presented in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286,
1288-91 (5th Cir. 1971) ; notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra.
4. In fiscal year 1969, for example, the following expenditure categories were
the most heavily funded according to federal, state and local figures combined:
National Defense
$84,496 (in millions)
Education ....
.
.
50,377
Interest on General Debt --------16,992
Highways
15,738
Public Welfare -...-- -------.. 14,730
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Table: EXPENDITURES OF ALL
GOVERNMENTS BY FUNCTION AND LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, cited in TAX FOUNDATION,
INC., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 16 (16th biennial ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as FACTS AND FIGURES].
Combined state and local spending in the same year revealed the following
priorities:
Education
$47,238 (in millions)
Highways
15,417
Public Welfare -....--------12,110
Health and Hospitals -----------8,520
Police and Fire .
.
5,694
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Table: STATE AND LOCAL DIRECT
GENERAL EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION AND STATE, cited in FACTS AND FIGURES,
supra at 132.
It should be noted that the state and local expenditures do not necessarily
indicate the amount of revenues collected, because intergovernmental transfers are

(655)
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ices of the not merely nice-to-have but necessary variety 5 have been slow
to receive national attention and concern primarily because they are a

peculiarly local function, supported and therefore administered almost
totally without the assistance of the federal or state governments. 6 Until
recently, another reason for the lack of active concern may well have been
the habitual inability of observers and residents alike to distinguish the
effects of governmental inaction and indifference from the overall squalor
7
and decay which by definition constitute slum areas.
With the advent of the War on Poverty and the widespread racial
unrest of the 1960s came the final loss of innocence regarding the causes
of poverty and racial strife," and in recent years the mandate of the fourteenth amendment that no state shall "deny to any person . . . the equal

protection of the laws" has operated to require government to recognize
and, as far as possible, to correct that share of the problem for which it
is responsible. 10 However, in the field of municipal services this developimportant in the funding of many state and local functions. Id. at 16. See note 75
infra. Debt financing also distorts the revenue/expenditure ratio. See FACTS AND
FIGURES, supra at 127.
5. This Comment is primarily concerned with those services which provide the
basic necessities of urban existence and which are funded in whole or in part out of
general municipal revenues. Included in this category would be services such as
police and fire protection, street and sidewalk paving, lighting and maintenance,
traffic control, surface drainage facilities and water conduits, and sewerage and sanitation, including garbage removal. Generally not included are services provided by
means of privately-owned public utilities because such entities are separate from local
government and subject to special regulation. See generally 12 E. MCQUILLAN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1970) ; A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION (1969). But see note 123 infra. Health and hospitals also present
many distinct and intricate questions which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The recreational and cultural services provided by local governments will
not be specifically discussed because, although they are extremely beneficial to the
community, such services are not as essential as the more basic services aforementioned, and they do not therefore command favored treatment by the courts. See
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), noted in 17 VILL. L. REV. 159 (1971)
(a 5-4 decision upholding a local government's decision to close municipal swimming
pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis). Mr. Justice Blackmun
stated in Palmer: "[tihe pools are not part of the city's educational system. They
are a general municipal service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety, and they
are a service, perhaps a luxury, not enjoyed by many communities." 403 U.S. at 229
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Notwithstanding this view, much of the theory concerning basic services developed in this Comment would be readily applicable to attempts
to equalize recreational and cultural services as well.
6. See note 75 infra.
7. See, e.g., text accompanying note 1 supra.
8. For a detailed discussion of the interrelationship of racial discrimination,

poverty, and racial strife, see

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT

(New York Times ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as RIOT CoMM'N REPORT].
temporary works on the incidence and causes of poverty abound. See, e.g., B.

ConWEIS-

BROD, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY: AN AMERICAN PARADOX (1965). An excellent
recent bibliography on the subject is D. TOMPKINS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE SIXTIES (1970).

9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ;Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noam. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ment has been slow, and it seems that one reason for the snail's pace has
been judicial uncertainty as to how current equal protection theories
should be applied in this area which has traditionally been entrusted to
the sole discretion of local officials." Another important reason has been
the general lack of knowledge about the practical and financial conditions
2
under which local governments operate.'
To date the landmark and still model decision in the area is Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw,l a in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found an equal protection violation where certain municipal
services financed out of general ad valorem property tax revenues were
being provided on a racially discriminatory basis. 14 However, explosive
developments in the closely-related field of education indicate that in the
near future the courts will be confronted with challenges which allege
discrimination in providing municipal services solely on the basis of the
wealth of the recipients, and which attack the very methods by which
those services are financed.1 5 Moreover, as in the case of education, with
each step of this development the fine balance which preserves the
separation of powers in our federal system must be carefully maintained.
The purpose of this Comment, therefore, is to consider, in the light
of recent equal protection decisions, the distinct but by no means unrelated
See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1087-1132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments in Equal Protection].
11. As one commentator has observed:
Courts have always been reluctant to enter the field of local government because
of traditional concepts of separation of powers and the courts' general feeling of
incompetence to provide a better result than locally elected officials.
Note, Equal Protection Across the Tracks - Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 32 U. PITT.
L. REV. 555, 567 (1971), citing Marshall v. Mayor & Bd. of Selectmen, 251 Miss.
750, 171 So. 2d 347, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965) ; Deerfield Park Dist. v.
Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
968 (1963).
12. There is a growing body of commentary on the problem of unequal municipal
services; however, none of the studies to date have attempted to present and analyze
the relevant financing aspects of local government. See Abascal, Municipal Services
and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 1367 (1969); Ellington & Jones, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw: The Court as
City Manager, 5 GA. L. REV. 734 (1971) ; Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side
of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. Civ.
RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 441 (1971); Ratner, supra note 3; Comment, Equal
Protection in the Urban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46
TUL. L. REv. 496 (1972) ; Note, supra note 11; Comment, Administration of Municipal
Services in Light of the Equal Protection Clause, 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 141 (1971) ;
Note, Equal Protection: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 568 (1971); Note, The Right to Adequate Municipal Services: Thoughts and
Proposals, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 753 (1969) ; 49 J. URBAN L. 432 (1971).
13. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), accord, Selma Improvement Ass'n v. Dallas
County Comm'n, 40 U.S.L.W. 2616 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 1972).
14. Id. For a full discussion of Hawkins, see notes 16-61 and accompanying
text infra.
15. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971), discussed at notes 78-88, 98 & 142 and accompanying text infra. There, the
California public school financing system, based in part on property tax revenues, was
held to be a denial of equal protection because it created a classification on the basis
of wealth which adversely affected the "fundamental interest" of education; the
quality of a child's education was made to depend upon the wealth of the taxpayers
in his school district.
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problems of (1) unequal distribution of municipal services on the basis
of wealth, and (2) the so-called "benefit" methods of financing those services which may result in either racial or pecuniary discrimination. Proceeding from the most settled to the most problematic in terms of policy as
well as law, the issues which present themselves are the following:
(1) Does racial classification in the provision of municipal services where those services are financed out of general revenues violate equal
protection ?
(2) Does classification according to wealth in the provision of
municipal services where those services are financed out of general revenues violate equal protection?
(3) Does racial classification which results when municipal
services are financed out of user charges or special assessments violate
equal protection?
(4) Does classification on the basis of wealth which results when
municipal services are financed out of user charges or special assessments
violate equal protection?
In addition, at every point the problem must be further analyzed in
terms of specific services, for all municipal services are not of equal importance in determining the quality of a neighborhood, and traditionally
different services have been financed by different methods, a fact which
must be borne in mind in attempting to analyze the legal implications.
At the outset, it must also be noted that due to the breadth and
variety of the services and issues involved, only a grossly oversimplified
analysis would produce a blanket rule for all possible situations. Instead
it is hoped that by separating the problem into its component parts and
attempting to indicate some of the legal and practical factors which must
be considered, the processes of scholarly analysis and reasoned judicial
decision-making will be assisted.
II.

HAWKINS V. TOWN OF SHAW
EQUALIZATION

A.

-

THE MODEL SERVICE

SUIT

Facts

6

Plaintiffs, poor' Negro citizens of Shaw, Mississippi, brought a
class action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 198317 seeking
16. The original complaint had alleged discrimination on the basis of wealth as
well as racial discrimination, but on appeal the claim of wealth discrimination was

abandoned. 437 F.2d at 1287 n.l. Nevertheless, Judge Tuttle, who wrote the Fifth

Circuit opinion, noted that wealth as well as race renders a classification highly
suspect and thus deserving of exacting judicial scrutiny. Id., citing McDonald v.

Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).

For a discussion of wealth

classifications in supplying municipal services, see notes 62-111 & 152-68 and
accompanying text infra.
17. The class action was authorized under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The alleged denial of equal protection was actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), which provides a civil remedy for deprivation of any individual's
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injunctive relief against the town,' 8 the town's mayor, clerk and aldermen, for alleged inequality in the provision of various municipal services
including street paving and lighting, sanitary sewers and surface water
drainage, water mains, fire hydrants and traffic control signs.19 The trial
court found for the defendants on the ground that since, in its opinion, the
evidence failed to support the claim of a classification based upon race,
the strict standard for equal protection was inapplicable, and under the
permissive standard the classification could not be found to be wholly
"without rational basis."'20 On appeal, the decision was reversed on the
grounds that appellants' statistical evidence made out a prima facie case
of racial discrimination, and that under the applicable more stringent
equal protection standard, the defenses offered by the appellees did not
establish a compelling state interest sufficient to rebut the presumption
against them. 21 Accordingly, the court ordered the appellees to cure the
constitutional rights and privileges. The basis of original federal jurisdiction was 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). On appeal, the case was heard by a three-judge panel comprised
of Judges Tuttle, Bell and Goldberg.
18. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961), the Supreme Court had
held that municipal corporations were not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, although municipal officers could be held personally liable for damages
under that section. The district court in Hawkins dismissed the claim against the
town on the ground that, apparently following Monroe, injunctive relief was not
available against a municipality. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1163
n.1 (N.D. Miss. 1969). On appeal, however, the circuit court followed its own
precedent of Harkless v. Sweeny, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 991 (1971), in holding that a municipality is a person within the meaning of
section 1983 for purposes of injunctive relief. 437 F.2d at 1293 & n.2. Nevertheless,
the issue does not appear to be entirely settled. See Note, Equal Protection: The
Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 568, 581-82 (1971).
19. 437 F.2d at 1288. Among the basic municipal services not involved in
Hawkins were police and fire protection (except as the adequacy of fire hydrants and
water pressure is related to fire protection), and garbage and refuse collection. The
latter two services had been included in the original complaint but were equalized
before trial. 303 F. Supp. at 1163 n.2. Sidewalks had also been included in the
original complaint but they were removed from issue before trial because they were
financed by means of special assessments and not out of general tax revenues. Id.
See Abascal, supra note 12, at 1369 & n.10, citing Answers to Interrogatories of
Plaintiffs, Feb. 12, 1968, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss.
1969). Thus, all of the services at issue in Hawkins were financed out of general
revenues. 437 F.2d at 1294 (Bell, J., concurring). For a discussion of inequalities
which may result when services are financed by means of special assessments or user
charges, see notes 134-68 and accompanying text infra.
20. 303 F. Supp. at 1168. The district court reviewed the various defenses
asserted (see notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra), and concluded that those
reasons, rather than any elements of racial discrimination, explained the disparity in
services established by the plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 26 & 27 infra.
Therefore the trial court never considered whether the defenses would amount to
"compelling state interests" under the strict equal protection standard. Instead, the
court, in concluding that the town's actions were to be judged under the rational
relation test, indulged in "all legitimate deductions to be made from the evidence
running counter to statistical racial disparity." 303 F. Supp. at 1168. For a discussion
of the two-level equal protection approach, see note 21 infra.
21. 437 F.2d at 1288, 1292. The Supreme Court has tended to employ a two-level
approach in reviewing claims of discrimination under the equal protection clause. In
the area of economic regulation the Court has followed a policy of restraint under
which a legislative classification enjoys a presumption of constitutionality and the
distinctions created by a challenged statute are only required to bear some rational
relationship to any conceivable legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). On the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" such as race (see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
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results of the discrimination by submitting an acceptable plan for the
22
equalization of the services in question within a reasonable time.
B. The Prima Facie Case

Although it was preceded by a growing line of cases in which courts
forsook their traditional restraint 23 and struck down discriminatory actions
of local governments, 24 Hawkins was the first successful broad-ranging
challenge to racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services.2 5
To establish their prima facie case appellants introduced the stark and
unrefuted statistical evidence that:
(1) In the town of 2,500 people, residential racial segregation was almost total - 97 per cent of the dwelling units occupied
by blacks were located in neighborhoods in which no whites resided.
(2) Nearly 98 per cent of all homes fronting on unpaved
streets were occupied by blacks.
(3) 97 per cent of the homes not served by sanitary sewers
were in black neighborhoods; a total of 20 per cent of the black
population did not have any sewer facilities.
(4) The town had acquired a significant number of medium
and high intensity mercury vapor street lighting fixtures, not one
of which had been installed in black neighborhoods; such neighborhoods were served only by much weaker bare bulb fixtures.
U.S. 356 (1886)), or in cases touching upon "fundamental interests" (see notes
62-71 and accompanying text infra), the presumption of validity is reversed, and
the court subjects the classification to the most rigid scrutiny. Under the strict
scrutiny approach, the state must establish not only that it has a compelling interest

which justifies its classification, but also that the distinctions drawn by the legislation
are necessary to accomplish that interest. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
8-9 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriages held violative of the

fourteenth amendment). See generally Developments in Equal Protection, supra
note 10, at 1077-1104. Since "[t]he actions of local governments are the actions of
the State," Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (emphasis supplied
by the Court), the constitutional mandate of equal protection applies to the legislative determinations of municipal governments as well as to those of state governments.
22. 437 F.2d at 1292. For a discussion of the type of relief selected by the
Hawkins court, see notes 56-61 and accompanying text infra.
23. See note 11 supra.

24. See, e.g., Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969) (held
that it is impermissible for a city to knowingly and actively participate in commercial
real estate development which would result in dislocation of disadvantaged groups) ;
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (equal
protection violation found where defendant did not attempt to relocate non-white
residents displaced by public urban renewal project) ; Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), affd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (city prohibited from interfering with private plan
to build low-income subdivision in an all-white ward) ; Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (desegregation order issued concerning administration of public housing program).
25. In Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), on a
complaint as all-encompassing as that in Hawkins, plaintiffs were successful only in
obtaining an order forbidding discrimination in the operation and maintenance of
municipal parks. For a full discussion of the Hadnott case, see notes 134-51 and
accompanying text infra.
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(5) Although drainage was a significant problem since the
town was located in a delta area, the black neighborhoods had been
provided with a poorly maintained system of drainage ditches or,
on many streets, nothing at all; while the white community had
either underground storm sewers or a continuous system of drainage ditches.
(6) Water pressure in many black areas was always insufficient since those areas were served by obsolete four, two or 1%
inch water mains, while the bulk of the white community was
26
served by six inch mains.
(7) Fire hydrants were sparsely furnished in black areas
(which, when combined with the low water pressure, created substantial fire hazards), and there were no traffic control signs in
27
the black neighborhoods.
Finally, appellants alleged that this disparity was the result of a long
history of racial discrimination.28 Judge Tuttle agreed that "[s]urely,
this was enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of racial dis'2 9
crimination.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in applying the statistical advocacy
technique of Hawkins in other cases will be the sheer magnitude of the
task involved when the setting shifts from Shaw, Mississippi, population 2,500, to a city of 250,000 or 22 million people.30 At the same
time, however, it is in the densely populated urban environment where
municipal services acquire their most vital importance and, therefore,
it is in these areas that service equalization suits would seem to be most
strongly indicated. Accordingly, judicial tolerance of some mathematical
inexactitude is to be expected in the framing of such cases. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, has developed the subrule that the mere fact that
some individuals within the allegedly disadvantaged group have received
some of the services in question does not prevent a prima facie showing
of discrimination, if the statistical evidence nevertheless demonstrates a
26. Brief for Appellants at 8, 10-11, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971).

27. 437 F.2d at 1288.
28. 437 F.2d at 1288-91.
29. Id. at 1288. The plaintiffs' statistical method of proof was crucial to the
Hawkins decision, for the court stated that "figures speak and when they do, Courts
listen." Id., quoting Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967). With respect to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by
means of statistical proof, see generally Fessler & Haar, supra note 12. On appeal in
Hawkins, the authors of that article submitted a brief as Amicus Curiae under the
auspices of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Harvard University.
30. 437 F.2d at 1288. A serious practical problem which arises in attempting to
employ statistics as the basis for proving discrimination in supplying services to a
large city is that the cost of collecting and analyzing the mass of statistical data
needed could be prohibitive, especially for the disadvantaged clients seeking relief.
One possible solution is suggested by the technique used in Hawkins - contracting
for the services of a recognized city planning expert who could then enlist the aid
of his students in compiling the raw data. Brief for Appellees at 20, Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). In future cases the expert could be
compensated but preferably would be a volunteer, having student assistants who could
be given academic credit for their contribution.
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very substantial overall disparity in the level of services provided.8 1
The converse of that proposition should also be true; i.e., the fact that some
members of the allegedly advantaged group are lacking the enumerated
services should not detract from the overall showing of discrimination. 2
One further problem which must be resolved in the process of alleging a prima facie case of discrimination is the standard of equality
to be applied. Plaintiffs in Hawkins claimed that they were the victims
of numerical, or so-called "input" inequality 3 However, there are two
other possible standards: (1) a level of minimally adequate performance; 3 4 and (2) a level of benefit determined according to needs ("output" or proportional equality) .3- Although the courts have not enunciated
clear rules to govern this question, to date the standard of "input"
equality appears to be judicially favored both in measuring discrimination and in framing remedies in the area of municipal services.30
31. See Fessler & Haar, supra note 12, at 453, citing Goins v. Allgood, 391
F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1968) and United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53,
66-67 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963).
32. In fact, the Hawkins court took this position with regard to several services
which the town claimed had been inadequately provided to some of the white neigh-

borhoods as well as to the black neighborhoods; e.g., surface drainage facilities and
water mains. 437 F.2d at 1290-91.
33. According to the concept of numerical equality, each individual should
receive or bear numerically identical amounts of the benefit being distributed or the
burden being imposed, without regard to other inequalities in the private situations
of the recipients. For a general discussion of the concepts of numerical and proportional, or "output" equality, see Developments in Equal Protection, supra note 10, at
1159-69. Although in practice the distinction between the two concepts may some,
times become blurred (see note 36 infra), it is fairly clear that the complaint in
Hawkins requested only substantial numerical equality. 437 F.2d at 1292 (Relief).
34. Fessler & Haar, supra note 12, at 461. It was also argued by the defense
in Hawkins with regard to street lighting. See note 53 infra. However, it is doubtful
that equality of minimally adequate performance can truly be considered "equality"
by any standard, and accordingly the Hawkins court rejected such a concept in favor
of the numerical standard. 437 F.2d at 1292.
35. In contrast to the standard of numerical equality, the principle of proportional, or "output," equality recognizes differences among men and may require
numerically different treatment because of such differences. See Developments in
Equal Protection, supra note 10, at 1166-69.
36. In addition to the choice of the numerical standard in Hawkins, similar
choices were made by the courts in Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967,
972-73 (M.D. Ala. 1970), and Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615-18, 487 P.2d 1241,
1263-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623-25 (1971). In Serrano, the court refused to follow
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), in which relief was denied on facts very similar to
those in Serrano, for the precise reason that plaintiffs in Mclnnis had steadfastly
contended that only an "educational needs" standard of equality would satisfy the
demands of equal protection. Id. at 615-16, 487 P.2d at 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24.
Notwithstanding judicial preference for the "input" standard of equality,
there are certain types of municipal services for which such a standard would be
inappropriate and some version of an "output" standard would appear to be required.
For example, where higher population densities tend to result in intensified degrees
of risk, police and fire protection goals must be allocated on a basis of equality of
protection rather than mere numerical equality of men and equipment on a simple
per capita basis. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text infra.
Moreover, in the case of some municipal services the distinction between
numerical and proportional equality is difficult to maintain because, in addition to the
simple numerical measures (e.g., per square foot of residential area or per capita),
other variables must be considered, such as traffic usage in the case of street paving
or natural topography in the case of drainage facilities. Thus, an element of "need"
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C. Defenses
Once the plaintiffs have established, by the above procedure, a
prima facie case of racial discrimination in providing municipal services,
the burden of producing evidence shifts to the defendants who, under
the strict standard for equal protection, bear a "very heavy burden of
justification. 8' 7 It has been suggested 38 that the defendants at this
juncture may proceed by one or more of the following approaches.
They may first challenge the scope or legal sufficiency of the mandate
for equality which plaintiffs have invoked; second, they may dispute the
accuracy or completeness of plaintiffs' statistical evidence; or finally,
they may offer proof of a rationale for the disparity in services which,
if accepted, would overcome the established inference of discrimination.
Since the first two approaches were largely foreclosed to defendants
in Hawkins, 9 their rebuttal evidence consisted primarily of explanations for the discriminatory situation, which the court examined in
40
light of the "compelling state interest" test.

Defendants first contended that Shaw was a small community with
an extremely static population and limited financial resources and, over
the years, had maintained a cautious fiscal policy and shown little popular interest in modern improvements. 4 1 This type of argument had
been rejected as insufficient by the Supreme Court just two years previously, 42 and was accorded an even less favorable reception by the court

in Hawkins. 43 Although the defendants enumerated more specific limitations, both practical and administrative, as justifications for the town's
criteria is unavoidably injected into an otherwise "numerical" standard. Clearly,
however, such an inevitable blurring of the distinction between the two standards of
equality should not justify numerical inequality nor defeat attempts to frame feasible
equalization orders. See, e.g., notes 56-61 & 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
37. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
38. See Fessler & Haar, supra note 12, at 447.
39. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
40. Appellees addressed the permissive "reasonable relationship" test rather than
the strict "compelling state interest" test. Brief for Appellees at 36-46, Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). However, having determined that
the strict standard was applicable, the court undertook its own independent review
of the evidence rather than remanding to the trial court for reargument. 437 F.2d
at 1288. When questions of equal protection are at issue such independent review
is fully authorized. See Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22, 23 (1967); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). See generally Fessler & Haar, supra note 12, at
445. Perhaps then the municipality should have anticipated that possibility in its
brief, notwithstanding the fact that "[o]nce the strict review standard has been
attained . . .the compelling interests which would sustain [the] governmental action
seem to exist only in theory." Id. at 444.
41. Brief for Appellees at 4-5, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971). According to the district court in Hawkins, "[t]hat was, apparently,
the kind of local government preferred by Shaw's citizens." 303 F. Supp. at 1168.
42. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1969) (state residency
requirement for welfare eligibility held violative of equal protection; state interest
in conserving the public fisc did not constitute a compelling governmental interest).
43. 437 F.2d at 1288. The Fifth Circuit did not even pause to discuss the question of administrative or financial infeasibility, evidently having satisfied itself that
such a defense was not colorable in the particular circumstances. But see notes 47-49
and accompanying text infra.
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policies, 44 the court continually returned to two basic objections. First,
said the court, while the alleged limitations might well explain a general inadequacy of services throughout the town, they could not justify
the demonstrated wide disparities between services provided in the black
and the white neighborhoods. 45 More importantly, the court insisted
that even assuming that the asserted explanations could be considered
compelling state interests, the record simply did not establish that the
town had actually and consistently followed the limiting criteria

it

46
claimed had been controlling.
It has been strongly suggested that in future similar actions this
"actual and consistent use" requirement may assume importance at
least equal to the "compelling state interest" test, since it precludes the
necessity of elaborating upon the latter test. 47 This development, it
appears, can cut two ways. On the one hand, it increases the already
near-insurmountable burden borne by the government. 48 On the other
hand, however, if actual reliance on the asserted justification can be
established, the lack of strong negative precedent relating to the compelling governmental interest test may facilitate a judicial finding that such
an interest is present in a proper case. This could be a highly salutary
development, especially in the local government area where critical prac49
tical limitations are often decisive.
In the course of their argument the defendants also offered an explanation with respect to the town's sanitary sewer system to the effect
that the town had been forced to bypass the older black residential areas
because of its "firm policy" to extend the service promptly into the
newly-built subdivisions developed for both races. 50 In concluding that

44. For example, the defendants asserted that streets were paved and street

lights provided according to traffic needs and usage, both of which were low in
Negro areas, and that, in addition, many of the streets on which the blacks lived
were too narrow to pave. They also pointed to the serious drainage problems caused
by the town's flat, nonporous soil as a justification for the demonstrated inadequacy
of drainage facilities in plaintiffs' neighborhoods. 437 F.2d at 1289-91.
45. Id. For example, the court observed that although narrow streets in the
black areas had not been paved, streets of the same width in white neighborhoods
were paved. Similar observations were made with reference to the differing quality of
drainage facilities in the black and the white sections.
46. Id. In addition to observations noted above (note 45 supra), the court
remarked that the town's engineer had no actual knowledge of traffic density or
usage in the black areas, and that while commercial areas in the white part of town
had high intensity mercury vapor street lighting, commercial areas in the Negro
sections were not similarly supplied, indicating the inconsistent application of the
town's asserted servicing policies if such policies existed at all.
47. See Fessler & Haar, supra note 12, at 445.
48. See notes 21 & 40 supra.
49. Financial limitations especially are of critical importance at the local government level, particularly with respect to services which are not subsidized by intergovernmental transfers. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text infra. In this
connection it should be noted that considerations which cannot be deemed compelling
governmental interests at the national or state levels because of the flexibility of
their resources may in fact constitute compelling interests at the local level because
of the severe financial and political limitations under which local governments operate.
50. Brief for Appellees at 31-32, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971).
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such a "subdivision capture policy" did not constitute a compelling justification, the court said that even assuming the doubtful proposition
that such a firm policy existed, "the fact that extensions are now made
to new areas in a non-discriminatory manner is not sufficient when the
effect of such a policy is to 'freeze in' the results of past discrimination." 5' 1
This ruling, while important in Hawkins, may be even more significant
when considered in the context of the "benefit" financing of certain
services.

52

A final defense intimated by appellees was that since the evidence
did not support a finding of any bad faith or intent to discriminate, no
discrimination should be inferred. 53 It is by now settled law that in a
strict scrutiny application of the equal protection guarantee such protestations are of absolutely no value and only a discriminatory result
need be shown. 54 Consequently, Judge Tuttle had little trouble disposing
of the matter. 55
D. Relief
Since it was treading a relatively novel path of encroachment upon
local governmental interests, the Hawkins court approached the question
of relief "not unaware of the fundamental institutional problems involved." 6 Said the court:
The need for judicially discoverable and manageable standards as
well as an awareness of the distinctions between the roles played
by the coordinate branches of government must, of course, be foremost in our mind. Nevertheless, having carefully considered the
57
problems involved, we feel this case warrants judicial intervention.
With respect to the question of judicially manageable standards, the
court explained that although it had no statutory guidelines or official
regulations which clearly defined the exact level of each service to be required, it had what it considered to be a very reliable yardstick, namely, the
quantity and quality of services provided to the white residents of Shaw.
This yardstick could be used with confidence because, as the court ob51. 437 F.2d at 1290.

52. See notes 145-51 and accompanying text infra.
53. Brief for Appellees at 8, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th

Cir. 1971).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956) ; Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1968) ;
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).

See generally Abascal, supra note 12, at 1381-82.
55. 437 F.2d at 1291-92. Appellees relied upon two additional defenses: (1)

since the street lights in the black sections were adequate, there was no equal protection violation; and (2) the disparity in sewerage facilities was due to the lack
of proper zoning regulations requiring residents to have indoor plumbing. To the
first argument the court replied that "[] mprovements to existing facilities provided
in a discriminatory manner may also constitute a violation of equal protection"
(437 F.2d at 1290 (emphasis supplied by the court)); and regarding the second
argument the court stated that it was simply circular reasoning, and no justification,
to assert that since indoor plumbing was not required, sewers were not provided. Id.
56. 437 F.2d at 1292.
57. Id.
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served, the black and white areas in Shaw did not differ significantly in
need or expectations. Clearly, however, so simple a standard could not
be applied in a large metropolitan area, where population densities, property uses, and even topography and degree of development can differ
widely in various sections. Therefore, as the number of service equalization suits proliferates, so also will the variety of remedies devised, and
this should prove to be an area in which imaginative advocacy can be
utilized to great advantage. 58
The problem of separation of powers, which is critical in cases such as
Hawkins,59 is basically the question of whether a public decision is to
be made by the bench or through the ballot. In remanding the case with
directions for the town officials to submit an equalization plan for court
approval, the court struck a neat balance between legislative and judicial
interests, preserving as much of the former as possible. To Judge Bell,
concurring, it was this aspect of the decision which was most meritorious
for, rather than seeking a political resolution of the whole problem of
the unequal distribution of municipal services as the district court had
done,60 the decision of the court of appeals provided ample opportunity
for the democratic process to function without sacrificing basic constitutional guarantees.0 1
E. Summary
The constitutional significance of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw is that
it has satisfactorily answered the question whether a racial classification
in furnishing municipal services requires the application of the restrictive
standard of equal protection, assuming such discrimination can be estab58. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Adequate Municipal Services: Thoughts and
Proposals, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 753, 763 (1969). The author suggests that formulas
could be developed for each specific municipal service similar to the "one man, one
vote" formula employed in reapportionment cases. Such formulas would take into
account the various factors which are properly considered in the distribution of each
service. While imaginative solutions are needed, the problem posed by judicial
reluctance to employ a "needs" standard of equality must also be kept in mind. See
note 36 supra.
59. See cases cited notes 24 & 25 supra. The cases cited therein demonstrate the
courts' concern with the separation of powers problem.
60. 303 F. Supp. at 1169. Apparently the district court was strongly influenced
by the fact that the black population of Shaw was not a minority but had voting
power approximately equal to that of the whites. Id. However, Judge Bell observed
that the Negroes did not obtain the vote until the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970), and that the first Negro official had been elected
to city council only within the past year. 437 F.2d at 1295 (Bell, J., concurring).
61. 437 F.2d at 1294-95 (Bell, J., concurring). The wisdom of taking such a
middle-line approach to relief is emphasized by the fact that the main cause of in-

equality in supplying municipal services has been the political impotence of the

disadvantaged groups. "As a generalization, it seems safe to say that the inadequacy
of municipal services in large areas of both rural and urban communities is a result
of the ineffective or non-existent political representation of those who live in those
areas." Abascal, supra note 12, at 1368. In the town of Shaw there was a newlyformed bi-racial planning committee, and as Judge Bell approvingly noted, the
requirement of an equalization plan would give the governing authorities, as assisted
by the planning committee, the opportunity to arrive at a constitutionally acceptable
plan through the participatory process. 437 F.2d at 1295 (Bell, J., concurring).
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lished and the services are financed out of general tax revenues. The
practical significance of Hawkins is that it is a true test case, providing
the basic prototype upon which future litigants can structure their lines
of attack and defense. It has been discussed in full detail in this section
because in the succeeding sections the focus shifts to the initial question
of whether certain other factual situations can qualify for strict scrutiny
review. If that question can be answered in the affirmative, the model of
Hawkins can provide the starting-point for litigation of those cases as well.
III.

WEALTH

CLASSIFICATIONS

A.

-

TAX

FINANCING

General Theory

Although it appears that courts and commentators generally agree
on the proposition that a classification which amounts to a "suspect classification" or adversely affects a "fundamental interest" must be subjected
to the "most rigid scrutiny," 62 there is almost equally general disagreement as to what the relationship is or ought to be between "suspect classifications" and "fundamental interests" in order to qualify for application
of the strict equal protection standard. 63 Thus, a showing of racial discrimination by a state is always sufficient to require strict scrutiny without
consideration of the fundamental interest factor, 64 but although some
decisions have suggested that the same might be true of wealth classifications,6 5 the actual holdings have not gone that far. 66 It appears that even
62. See note 21 supra. The "most rigid scrutiny" language is from Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), which involved wartime restrictions upon
persons of Japanese lineage.
63. Compare Developments in Equal Protection, supra note 10, at 1120-21
(proposing a gradient approach to the interrelationship between the two concepts),
with Michaelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 25-28 (1969) (arguing that the wealth classification decisions to date can all be explained simply as statements as to the importance
of the interests involved rather than as holdings creating a separate doctrine forbidding pecuniary discrimination).
64. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971);
Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
65. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1967).
There, the Supreme Court stated:
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth . . . [a] factor which would independently render
a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial
scrutiny.
Id. at 807, citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See also
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It was suggested in this case that:
[Judicial confidence in the propriety of legislative and administrative judgments]
is often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and of racial minorities
are involved. For these groups are not always assured of a full and fair hearing
through the ordinary political processes .. .because of the abiding danger that the
power structure . . . may incline to pay little heed to even the deserving interests
of a politically voiceless and invisible minority. These considerations impel a
closer judicial surveillance and review of administrative judgments adversely
affecting racial minorities, and the poor, than would otherwise be necessary.
269 F. Supp. at 507-08 (footnotes omitted).
66. For example, Harper involved the "fundamental interest" of voting as well
as a wealth classification (see note 67 infra), while Hobson was primarily a case of
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though wealth classifications are indeed considered suspect, they must also
adversely affect a "fundamental interest" before strict scrutiny will be
applied.67 For some time, it appeared that the "fundamental interest"
category might be limited primarily to interests in the criminal justice
system and voting rights, 68 but in a current wave of cases beginning with
Serrano v. Priest 9 public education has been held to constitute a "fundamental interest" for purposes of equal protection. In the wake of these
decisions the question arises with more insistence than before: Are there
not other traditional municipal services financed out of general revenues
which can be deemed "fundamental interests" and which therefore may
not be provided in a manner which discriminates according to wealth?
The initial question to consider in making the above inquiry is,
what is a "fundamental interest?" Although it is possible at this time
to catalogue the interests which have been held "fundamental" in the
equal protection context, 70 it is much more difficult to discover a unifying
theory to explain such determinations. Indeed, the courts themselves have
treated the cases on an ad hoc basis without formulating such a theory, and
it seems that the only common thread in those decisions is the courts'
belief that the favored interests are simply more important than others
because of the severity of the detriment incurred when such interests are
abridged.7 1 Despite the fact that such an approach is too imprecise to be
considered a legal standard, it may nonetheless afford at least an initial
guideline which can then be augmented by the reasoning in Serrano in
examining the question of municipal services as "fundamental interests."
racial discrimination. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), with Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noma.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
67. Wealth classification cases in recent years have also involved either interests
in criminal procedure or voting or, to a lesser extent, the interest in interstate
travel or procreation. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) ; Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); and
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal procedure) ; Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) ; and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting) ; Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
68. See note 67 supra. The racial discrimination decisions following Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), have demonstrated the fundamental importance
of education. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1963) ; Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Yet full recognition of education as a fundamental interest
was not complete until Serrano. See Developments in Equal Protection, supra note
10, at 1129.
69. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See also Rodriguez
v. San Antonio, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam) ; Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491
P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). But see Spano v. Board of Educ.. ......
App. Div. 2d ......
-----N.E.2d

___

N.Y.S.2d ____(Sup. Ct. 1972).

70. See note 67 supra.
71. See Developments in Equal Protection,supra note 10, at 1130.
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B. Fire and Police Protection
In terms of importance to the individual and to society and the
corresponding severity of detriment when denied, it is clear that education, voting and interests in the criminal process are primary concerns.
But is it not also true that adequate food, clothing, housing, gas, water,
electricity and fire and police protection are the basic elements of survival, especially in a dense urban environment, and are therefore equally
important interests? Why, then, should they not all be considered "fundamental interests?" The obvious answer is that the organization of
72
American society is in the form of a "free enterprise democracy," where
most of the necessities of life are to be acquired in the marketplace by
means of the pricing principle and where, in theory at least, each individual or family is expected to earn sufficient income to provide for
their basic needs in that manner. 73 There is no constitutional "right" of
survival. Nevertheless. there are some necessities which have been removed from the competition of the marketplace, either by the courts or by
governments themselves, and which have been required to be provided
out of public revenues without reference to the wealth of the recipients.
Such is the case with the interests which have been deemed "fundamental"
in the equal protection decisions. 74 Such is also the case with fire and
police protection, which next to education are the traditional mainstay of
municipal services, and which are nearly7 5 always provided, at great expense, wholly out of the public coffers.
72. Serrano v.Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
619 (1971).

73. See Michaelman, supra note 63, at 12.

74. See generally Michaelman, supra note 63, at 9-13.
75. Municipal fire and police departments were firmly established at the beginning
of this century. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 61 S.W. 590 (1901) (discussing the importance of the police force and its origins in the common law) 16
E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 45.02, at 630 n.33 (3d ed.
rev. 1963). The McQuillan treatise notes that "[in 1902 it was estimated that in

proportion to population the fire force of this country was nearly four times that of

Germany or France, and about three times that of England." Id.
Raw expenditure figures show that throughout this century fire and police
have constituted a major share of the local government budget:
(in millions)

Year

Education

Highways

Public
Welfare

Health &
Hospitals

Police
& Fire

1932
1940
1948
1956
1960
1965
1969

2,033
2,263
4,298
11,082
15,323
22,382
34,934

898
780
1,526
2,586
3,358
4,007
5,003

370
629
1,137
1,536
2,183
3,317
5,646

241
309
566
1,302
1,898
2,660
4,262

513
566
985
1,909
2,607
3,507
5,109

1902

$ 238

$ 171

27

$

$ 90

$ 28

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Table: LOCAL DIRECT EXPENDIFuNCTIONS, SELECTED FISCAL YEARS 1902-1969, cited in FACTS AND
TURES FOR OWN

FIGURES, supra note 4, at 222. Moreover, in view of the fact that unlike fire and police
services, the amounts available for highways, public welfare, and health and hospitals
as well as education include heavy federal and state subsidies (see ADVISORY COMM'N
ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

STATE AND

LOCAL

FINANCES

-

SIGNIFICANT
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Thus, fire and police protection can be distinguished from such necessities as housing and electricity because the latter are distributed on the
pricing principle (although government is often heavily involved). On the
other hand, fire and police protection are also distinguishable from other
municipal services such as street paving, lighting and cleaning, sewers
and drainage, traffic control and garbage collection for two reasons. First,
while in the aggregate such "other services" are necessary for urban
existence and are therefore extremely important, individually their absence would not create a detriment as severe as loss of fire or police protection. Secondly, these other services have often been provided on a quasipricing principle, 76 indicating the somewhat lesser public priority accorded
them by municipal governments themselves.7 7 In sum, there is a strong
analogy between education and fire and police services, both in their
actual importance to the individual and to society and in the priority accorded them by municipal governments, as reflected in their similar levels
and methods of funding.
Considered in conjunction with the "severity of the detriment" approach, 78 the reasoning in Serrano supports the conclusion that at least
police protection, and probably fire protection as well, should be classed
with education as "fundamental interests." For example, one of the
Serrano court's techniques was to compare the purposes and importance
of other "fundamental interests" with those of education. Thus, it obTables 14-16, at 45-51 (No. M-50, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
SIGNIFICANT FEATURES]), it would appear that

FEATURES 1967-1970,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS -

in terms of strictly local priorities, fire and police are second only to education in
importance.
Finally, and most notably, police and fire services have traditionally been
financed through the use of general tax revenues rather than by means of benefit
financing as are other basic municipal services. Kafoglis, Local Service Charges:
Theory and Practice, in STATE AND LOCAL TAX PRO3LEMS 173 (H. Johnson ed.
1969). See note 76 infra.
76. For a general discussion of benefit financing, see notes 120-33 and accompanying text infra. Special assessments are often levied to finance local street services
such as original grading, construction and paving, widening, curbing and guttering,
and for the original construction and sometimes the maintenance of sidewalks. 14 E.
McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.12, at 68 (rev. vol.
J.
Lattal ed. 1970). In addition, where local law permits, special assessments have been
charged for street sprinkling and cleaning (id. § 38.22, at 91), for the construction of
local sewers, drains and ditches, and for the replacement of such facilities should
they become inadequate (id. §§ 38.24 to 38.25a, at 93-102), for the erection of street
lights (id. § 38.26, at 102), and for the installation of water pipes for the purpose of
distributing water to a particular area. Id. § 38.27, at 103-06.
User charges are imposed for all manner of municipal services, including
especially sanitation services such as sewerage disposal, waste collection, street cleaning and snow removal. See G. BOYLE, USE OF SERVICE CHARGES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 18-30 (Nat'l Industrial Conference Bd., Studies in Business Economics,
No. 68,
1960). Although it is true that no charges are collected for the primary functions
performed by the education, fire and police departments, Boyle notes that charges
have been levied for peripheral functions such as school lunch programs or essentially
private services such as police details at private affairs and refilling fire extinguishers.
Id. at 20-21.
77. To state that such services are of lesser importance than education, fire and
police protection does not, however, mean that they may not command a special degree
of judicial scrutiny. See notes 95-111 and accompanying text infra.
78. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
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served that although an individual's interest in his rights as a criminal defendant are certainly unique, from a larger perspective education may have
far greater social significance because it directly affects many more people,
it indirectly reduces the crime rate, and it also supports every other value
of a democratic society, including participation, communication and social
mobility.7 9 While these statements may not be immediately applicable to
fire protection, they relate very strongly to local law enforcement, which
affects literally everyone in society, s0 directly reduces the crime rate,
and provides the basic framework of law and order without which none
of the other values of a democratic society would be attainable.8 '
Similarly, the Serrano court concluded that education is even more
analogous to voting than to protections during the criminal process, because both education and voting are "crucial to participation in, and the
functioning of, a democracy. ' '8 2 Quoting from Reynolds v. Sims, the
Serrano court emphasized that voting is regarded as a fundamental right
because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights ... ,3
including that of free speech.8 4 It stands to reason, however, that just
as law making through voting is preservative of all other political rights,
so also is law enforcement, which at the local level is accomplished
through the police force, and for that reason as well police protection
should be considered a "fundamental interest."
Of course it is true, as the court observed in Serrano, that only
education provides the instruction and cultural enrichment which equip
an individual for economic and social success and for participation in
political and community life, so to that extent the analogy between education and other municipal services is incomplete. However, from a
more pessimistic perspective it is equally true that it is impossible to
instruct or enrich people unless they can move freely and without fear
79. 5 Cal. 3d at 584, 487 P.2d at 1257-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.

80. It appears that in its zeal to emphasize the importance of education the
Serrano court may have created a few minor distortions regarding other services.
For example, the court remarked that "not every person finds it necessary to call
upon the fire department or even the police department in an entire lifetime ...
Every person, however, benefits from education ....
" 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at
1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, quoting Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF.
L. REv. 305, 388 (1969). Clearly, the primary purpose of police protection and a
major purpose of fire protection is to provide preventive services which will render it
unnecessary to call upon those departments. Fire and police protection benefit all
citizens throughout their lives regardless of whether or not they ever develop a need
for specific assistance.
81. Particularly appropriate in this connection is Hobbes' famous statement about
the human condition in the absence of laws and law enforcement:
[In a time of anarchy] there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is
uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation; nor use of
the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; . . . no
arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger
of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64 (2d ed. 1886) (emphasis added).
82. 5 Cal. 3d at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
83. Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618, quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
84. Id. at 609 n.25, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.25.
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within their own community.8 5 Recognition of this fact abounds in the
current flood of literature decrying "crime in the streets" and calling for
stronger law enforcement.8 6 Moreover, while police protection does not
"mold the personality" 87 in the positive sense as does education,
a lack of
that protection and the physical danger and insecurity which result must
surely leave permanent and ugly scars on the personality - scars which
can impair the ability to utilize the advantages offered by education. 8
At first glance fire protection might seem to be a much less important service than police protection. However, that impression may exist
because fires are easier to prevent and control than crime. Despite its
low visibility the fire department also performs functions which are
absolutely indispensible to the community and which cannot be obtained
privately.8 9 For this reason, local government has traditionally recognized its duty to provide fire as well as police protection out of general
revenues without resorting to "benefit" financing, and to provide them
at consistently high levels of expenditure. 90 Therefore, if police protection is deemed to be a "fundamental interest" for the reasons outlined
85. The situation in Philadelphia is typical:
On any given school day last fall about 13,000 Philadelphia public high school
pupils were not in school.
That is a 25 per cent absentee rate.
It's only an average, however. In some high schools, like Thomas Edison
and Benjamin Franklin [situated in some of the worst ghetto sections], over a
third of the pupils were absent each day.
Superintendent of Schools Mathew W. Costanzo proposed two measures to improve what he termed "dropping attendance figures and rising dropout rates ......
One is safe corridors to guarantee safe pupil access to and from schools
in gang areas.
[The other is to increase the number of truancy workers and make further
studies of the problem.]
THE SUNDAY BULLETIN (Philadelphia), Jan. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 5 (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970); M. GORDON, SICK CITIES
160 et seq. (1969).
87. 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 489 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
88. Id. at 611, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619. Here again the Serrano
court appeared to indulge in a bit of hyperbole when it stated that unlike education,
police and fire protection (as well as garbage collection and street lights) are
essentially neutral in their effect on the individual psyche. On the contrary, high
crime rates are inextricably linked with a pervasive atmosphere of insecurity, which
in turn inevitably impairs human development capacities. "Because most middle-class
Americans live in neighborhoods [with relatively low crime rates], they have little
comprehension of the sense of insecurity that characterizes the ghetto resident."
RIOT COMm'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 267. "Nothing is more fundamental to the
quality of life in any area than the sense of personal security of its residents, and
nothing affects this more than crime." Id. at 266.
89. See 16 E. McQUILLAN, supra note 75, § 45.02, at 629-31. The author suggests
the critical nature of fire protection:

Fire is one of the foremost foes of cities and towns. At one time or another

it has caused great devastation in urban centers in nearly every country in the
civilized world. The burning of Rome in the year 64 A.D., the many fires in
London, including "The Great Fire" in 1666, the numerous fires in the United
States as the Boston fire in 1872, the St. Louis fire in 1851, the Chicago fire in
1871, the most disastrous of modern times, and the San Francisco fire in 1906,
are all matters of history. To combat this danger, fire companies, public or
voluntary, exist in practically every populous center in the United States.
Id. at 629-30 (footnotes omitted).
90. See notes 4 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
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above, it would seem that the two services should be linked together and
police and fire protection should be accorded "fundamental interest"
treatment.9 1

It should be noted, however, that in evaluating fire and police protection under the equal protection clause, the problem of determining
the appropriate standard of "equality" is particularly troublesome since
"numerical" equality in areas with differing crime rates would obviously not result in equality of protection. 92 Indeed, there is evidence
that according to the numerical standard fire and police services are
provided at least equally if not more intensively in disadvantaged areas.93
However, the stronger evidence indicates that disparities do exist which
94
should be deserving of constitutional redress.
C.

Other Basic Services -

Proposed Theory

As can be ascertained from the foregoing analysis, 95 it is unlikely that
basic municipal services other than fire and police can reasonably be
categorized as "fundamental interests," despite their collective importance
to urban residents. Nevertheless, when poor neighborhoods are underserviced the hardship to the residents is as great as when racially segregated neighborhoods are underserviced.9° Must the fact that such essential services as street paving and lighting, garbage collection, sewerage
and drainage do not quite qualify for "fundamental interest" status inevitably result in there being no viable equal protection remedy where
such services are being provided unequally to economically disadvantaged
areas? The commentators on this question almost unanimously agree
that wealth classifications in supplying these services should be actionable
as denials of equal protection with good chances of success. 97 Indeed,
91. It also appears that fire hydrants and water pressure (as provided by means
of adequate water conduits) should be classified as part of fire protection (see text
accompanying note 26 supra), rather than as one of the lesser municipal services.
See notes 95-111 and accompanying text infra.
92. See Note, supra note 58, at 763 n.47 (stating that the police force must vary
with the crime rate as well as according to population) ; note 36 supra.
93. RIOT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 267. Statistics for five Chicago
police districts showed that in the high-income white district there were approximately
93 patrolmen assigned per 100,000 residents, while in a very low income Negro district
there were 291 patrolmen per 100,000 residents. Id.
94. For example, when considered in light of the crime rate, the figures cited
above (note 93 supra), take on a different character. In the affluent white district
there were only 80 major crimes against persons and 1,038 major crimes against
property per 100,000 population, but in the poor black district the number of crimes
was 2,820 and 2,630 against persons and property respectively. RIOT COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 8, at 267. Thus if the crime rate is used as the measure of police protection, such protection in the poorer district was only about 63 per cent as adequate
as in the well-to-do district. See also Ratner, supra note 3, at 8-10; Note, supra
note 58, at 763.
95. See notes 77 & 78 and accompanying text supra.
96. On the seriousness of the losses that result when basic municipal services
are inadequately provided, see generally Ratner, supra note 3, at 19-21.
97. See Abascal, supra note 12, at 1383, 1388; Fessler & Haar, supra note 12,
at 464; Ratner, supra note 3, at 31-32; Comment, Equal Protection in the Urban
Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TUL. L. REv. 496, 507-11
(1972); Comment, Administration of Municipal Services in Light of the Equal
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the courts which decided both Hawkins and Serrano indicated concern
about the problem and a disposition toward seeing the law in the area
develop further. 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself appears to be
reaching a point where the rigidity of the "two-level" approach to equal
protection is causing severe strain and may need modification. 99
If the strict scrutiny approach is not available to litigants alleging
discrimination according to wealth in furnishing many municipal services, there are two alternatives open to the courts if they wish to remedy
the situation on equal protection grounds. First, they could alter the traditional permissive test by increasing the burden of proof on the government, requiring perhaps not only a truly rational justification for the
classification'" 0 but also proof of actual and consistent reliance upon the
justification. 1 1 Secondly, they could use an unweighted balancing test
for equal protection, eliminating both the presumption in favor of the
plaintiffs which obtains under the restrictive approach and the presumption for the government under the permissive approach. 10 2 Although the
Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the traditional test in Dandridge
v. Williams'0 seems to foreclose any modification of that test in the
near future, the suggestion was most strongly urged there by Mr.
Justice Marshall in dissent that in certain classes of cases the Court
should eschew the traditional test in favor of an unweighted balancing
approach.

10 4

Plaintiffs in Dandridge were welfare recipients with large families
who challenged the maximum per family ceiling which Maryland had
placed on welfare benefits, arguing that the ceiling penalized families
with more than five children and thus created an invidious discrimination in violation of equal protection. 0 5 The Supreme Court upheld the
Maryland financing scheme under the traditional test, stating that welProtection Clause, 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 141-42 (1971); Note, supra note 18,
at 572-74; Note, supra note 58, at 761-64; 49 J. URBAN L. 432, 437 (1971). But see
Ellington & Jones, supra note 12, which appears to take the view that no further extension of the equal protection doctrine in the area of municipal services is warranted.
98. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1287 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615 n.31, 487 P.2d 1241, 1262 n.31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 622-23
n.31 (1971).
99. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ; notes 105-11 and accompanying text infra.
100. Mr. Justice Marshall made a similar suggestion in Dandridge. 397 U.S. at
529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Such a requirement would be similar to the test used in Hawkins (see notes
46-49 and accompanying text supra), but instead of also requiring a compelling
governmental interest, only actual and consistent reliance upon an asserted reasonable
justification would be required.
102. See note 21 supra.
103. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
104. 397 U.S. at 508-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note
109 infra.
105. Plaintiffs also claimed that the state-imposed ceiling on their benefits contravened the spirit of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 301 to 1394 (1964), and specifically violated section 402(a) (10) of the
Act, which provided that aid should be furnished "with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1964). The Court disposed of this
argument before turning to plaintiffs' equal protection claims. 397 U.S. at 476-83.
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fare benefits were within the category of "economics and social welfare"
for which there was a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the government. 0 In reaching its decision, however, the majority expressed
severe misgivings about relying on "traditional test" precedents which
primarily involved state regulation of business or industry, 10 7 when it
recognized the "dramatically real factual difference" between the cited
cases and the one before it, which involved "the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings."' 0 8
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion did not assert that welfare benefits constitute a "fundamental interest" in the equal protection
sense, in the same manner that the foregoing analysis in this Comment
did not attempt to argue in favor of "fundamental interest" treatment for
the basic municipal services other than fire and police protection. Instead., he emphasized the admitted incongruity of measuring a state's
welfare policies by the same equal protection standard as has traditionally
been applied to state industrial and commercial regulations, and urged
that the Court utilize an unweighted balancing test when serious individual interests were at stake:
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a "right," fundamental
or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon the
character of the classification in question, the relative importance to
individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in
support of the classification. 10 9
Further, it should be noted that although the majority in Dandridge
could not find a satisfactory rationale for departing from the traditional
test, the case lacked a clear-cut "suspect classification" as well as a
colorable "fundamental interest." 110 Therefore, it appears that the holding in Dandridge would not foreclose the possibility of utilizing an unweighted equal protection test in a case which presented a "suspect
classification" according to wealth and individual interests as important
as the interest in obtaining essential municipal services other than fire
and police protection."'
106. 397 U.S. at 484-85, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City
61 (1911).
107. 397 U.S. at 485.
108. Id.
109. 397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. The discrimination claimed by plaintiffs was not racial discrimination, as the
Court noted (id. at 485 n.17), nor was it discrimination on the basis of wealth;
plaintiffs argued that the financing scheme discriminated against them merely because
of the size of their families. Id. at 475. Moreover, welfare benefits have never been
considered "fundamental interests." See note 67 supra; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
111. For further discussion and application of the unweighted balancing test, see
notes 152-68 and accompanying text infra.
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Summary

Judging on the basis of the "severity of the detriment" analysis as
well as the reasoning in Serrano, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that fire and police protection should be considered "fundamental interests"
and should, therefore, compel strict scrutiny review when provided in a
manner which discriminates according to wealth. Although other necessary municipal services do not appear to constitute "fundamental interests," the courts and commentators have indicated strong policy reasons
for their not being the subject of wealth classifications. Furthermore, the
"unweighted" balancing approach provides a fair and legally feasible solution to the apparent dilemma.

IV.

BENEFIT FINANCING

A.

Background

For a proper appreciation of the issue of "benefit" financing as it relates to racial and wealth classifications in municipal services, it is necessary to understand at least in outline the development and present configuration of local government finances. The following discussion, therefore, is presented as a general background for the ensuing sections, with
further information to be added where relevant.
It is a universally recognized fact that local governments generally,
and the great urban centers in particular, are in the throes of an everdeepening struggle for financial survival. 112 The roots of the problem can
be traced to the period between 1900 and 1930, when the movement of
large numbers of people into the cities produced great demands upon city
governments to provide the expanded services necessitated by urban concentration. This burden could be supported by the cities at that time
because their tax bases were able to grow apace with the burgeoning
prosperity of the community. However, with the exodus of residents and
businesses to the suburbs beginning in the 1930s, the large city lost much
of its strong tax base and found itself confronted instead with a dual
problem: the high costs of servicing, educating and "welfaring" the lowincome residents who continued to migrate to the cities, and the further
strain caused by the commuting population, which still required most of
the services it had formerly enjoyed but was no longer paying taxes to
the city. I ' 3 In many cases the situation of the suburban government has not
been appreciably better because the rapid development of new areas has
created the necessity for immediately supplying many services, such as
112. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (No. M-47, 1969) [hereinafter cited as INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS THE FEDERAL SYSTEM].

113. For a good summary of the effects of the rural-urban-suburban population

shifts in recent decades, see J. DE TORRES, FINANCING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 12-14 (The

Conference Board, formerly Nat'l Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Business
Economics, No. 96, 1967).
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new sewers, streets and schools. In addition, the relative lack of business
and industry in these areas has resulted in an inadequate tax base in
suburbia as well."

4

Finally, the slow financial death of the rural com-

munities left behind in the successive population shifts completes the picture of fiscal crisis affecting many, but not all, local governments." 5
This growing fiscal crisis has prompted local governments increasingly to seek needed revenues from sources in addition to the local property tax, which has traditionally provided the bulk of municipal funds." 6
Intergovernmental transfers from the federal and state governments have
provided the largest share of the needed revenue, but such funds do not
represent the complete solution because they are generally earmarked for
services such as education, highways and welfare which have significant
"spillover" effects beyond the municipal boundaries." 7 Virtually no intergovernmental funds are available to help finance what are regarded as
purely local services such as fire and police protection, local street paving
and drainage, and traffic control and sanitation." 8 In their quest for revenues, therefore, local governments have also implemented sales and income or wage taxes, where permitted by state law," 9 and have increasingly concentrated on so-called "benefit" financing methods, which include
120
user charges and special assessments.
114. Id. The plight of many of the suburban areas is graphically illustrated in
Serrano where all but the highest-income or most heavily industrialized school districts had anemic tax bases which could not adequately support the tax burdens they
were obliged to bear, even when the communities made extraordinary tax efforts.
5 Cal. 3d at 592-96, 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605-08.

115. The town of Shaw, Mississippi, is in fact one of the myriad rural communities which have been slowly atrophying due to population shifts. Brief for
Appellee at 2, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
116. For discussions of the increasing inadequacy of the property tax as presently
administered and suggestions of alternative and additional revenue sources, see, e.g.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS THE FEDERAL SYSTEM supra note 112, at 17-18;
J. DE TORRES, supra note 113, at 6-12; Kafoglis, supra note 5, at 164-86; J. MAXWELL,
FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 157-78 (rev. ed. 1969).
117. See J. DE TORRES, supra note 113, at 6-9.
118. See note 75 supra.
119. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note
112, at 37-38; J. DE TORRES, supra note 113, at 9-11.
120. See G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 11-12 (quoting Census Bureau statistics):
The combination of a demand for expanded services and a relatively inelastic
source of revenue has fostered the development of nonproperty tax sources. These
include an increased use of taxes levied on sales and gross receipts, and individual
and corporate incomes, and license fees.
However, the greatest increase, both absolute and relative, has occurred in
charge and miscellaneous revenues [of which service charges tend to account for
approximately 70 per cent of the combined total (id. at 12 n.2), and special
assessments are a rather small portion of the total (see note 130 infra)]. In 1940,
the general revenues of local governments from their own sources totaled $5,007
million; by 1957 they had increased to $18,018 million. During this period
property tax receipts declined as a share of this total from 83% to 70%, while
nonproperty taxes increased from 7% to 11% of this total. Charges and miscellaneous revenues, accounting for 10% of the total in 1940, represented 20%
of "general revenue from own sources" in 1957, nearly a sixfold increase in
absolute amounts.
Id. (footnotes omitted). A good short summary of the use of special assessments
during this century can be found in ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING

POWERS 50-51 (No. A-14, 1962)

[hereinafter cited as INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
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A user or service charge can be defined as a payment received by the
government from the public for the performance of specific services benefiting the person charged.1 2 1 Special assessments are defined as "special
and local impositions upon the property in the immediate vicinity of
municipal improvements, which are necessary to pay for the improvement, and are laid with reference to the special benefit which the property is supposed to have derived therefrom.' 22 Both types of financing
require state legislative authorization and are subject to certain traditional minimum constitutional and statutory requirements. 123 The main
distinction between the two types of fee turns on whether a service or
improvement primarily benefits the person or the property affected. Their
chief similarity is that theoretically both are levied in proportion to the
amount of benefit conferred 124 (hence the appellation of "benefit" financing), and as such are allocational in effect rather than redistributional
as is the case with general taxation. 25 To the municipality, "benefit"
financing has the advantage of not being subject to tax or debt limitations, 26 thus enabling the municipality to offer governmental services
which it might not otherwise be able to provide. The primary advantage
to the individual "consumer" is that the use of either service charges
TIONS -

RESTRICTIONS

ON LOCAL TAXING].

For statistics on the current use of

special assessments and user charges, see note 130 infra.
121. G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 13-14, citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPENDIUM
OF CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1957, at 141 (1958).
122. 14 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 76, § 38.01, at 10.
123. Regarding the power to levy special assessments, see 14 E. McQUILLAN,
supra note 76, § 38.06, at 43-50. For the specific constitutional and statutory requirements which special assessments must satisfy (basically concerning reasonableness
and relationship of benefit to burden), see 14 E. MCQUILLAN, supra §§ 38.03 to 38.05,
at 23-43. At present the law of user charges appears to be largely undeveloped,
thus presenting interesting questions outside the scope of this Comment. However,
with respect to the question of municipal authorization to levy such charges and the
basic limitations to which they are subject, the law of user charges is treated as a
part of the body of law relating to public utilities. See 12 E. MCQUILLAN, supra
note 5, §§ 35.37(a) to 35.37(k), at 479-97. Therefore, where a municipality owns
its own servicing facilities; e.g., sewerage lines or garbage collection equipment,
it has the right to charge consumers who use those services under the same principle
that authorizes a privately owned public utility to charge for its services. Id. § 35.37,
at 479-83. Also, according to traditional law, the rates charged by the municipality
must be fair, reasonable, just, uniform and nondiscriminatory, with certain qualifications, and the burden is on the objecting party to prove unreasonableness or discrimination. Id. §§ 35.37(a) & 35.37(b), at 483-88.
124. See G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 14 (user charges) ; 14 E. MCQUILLAN, supra
note 76, § 38.02, at 18-21 (special assessments).
125. "Allocational" in this context means that the benefits received are roughly
proportional to the payments contributed, as, for example, in the case of goods privately
purchased. "Redistributional," on the other hand, usually refers to tax appropriations,
and means that goods or services are provided according to some criteria other than
consideration of the relative amount contributed by the various participants. See
generally Kafoglis, supra note 75, at 164-66.
126. Special assessment obligations are universally held not to be included within
municipal debt limitations. See 15 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 41.32, at 367-70 (3d ed. 1970). Nor are they subject to local tax limits.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS - RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING, supra note
120, at 50. Despite the apparent lack of well-developed law concerning user charges
(see note 123 supra), they would also appear to be without such limitations. See
generally S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 761-70
(1970).
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or special assessments assures the service recipient of benefits at least
equal to the contribution made, 27 in contrast to the redistributional effects
of taxation. In the majority of cases, the benefit received greatly exceeds
the amount of the contribution, for after the initial installation special
assessment-financed improvements are ordinarily maintained by means of
general revenues, 128 and service charges usually represent a relatively small
proportion of the total cost of providing a "charge-financed" service. 129
In practice, special assessments have extremely limited applicability
and hence afford little prospect of producing increased revenues for underfinanced municipal governments."30 On the other hand, service charges
are already widely used,13 ' and economists have advocated experimentation
with increased and more efficient utilization of the service charge principle, primarily to augment local revenues but also to promote economy
of operation." 32 Acutely aware of equity considerations, the economists
have also suggested that such a development could be arranged so as to
be beneficial rather than detrimental to low income families. 133 In summary, then, it can be seen that a great deal of benefit financing is currently in use, and since higher levels of benefit financing may be necessary
because of municipal financial realities, local voters and officials need considerable discretion to determine the combination of revenue devices most
appropriate for their particular situation.
127. See G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 14 (user charges) ; 14 E. MCQUILLAN, supra
note 76, § 38.02, at 18 (special assessments).
128. See 14 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 76, § 38.16, at 79. In addition, in many
cases only part of the cost of a local improvement is covered by the special assessment; the remainder will then be paid out of general revenues. Id. § 38.12, at 73-74.
129. See J. MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 177, 257 (Table A-19). There, the
author demonstrates that user charges commonly constitute from 30 per cent to 75
per cent of total expenditures for given services (e.g., 30.7 per cent in the case of
sanitation services in 1966), with the remainder of the necessary funds provided out
of the general revenues. The explanation for the "subsidy" is found in considerations
either of equity or of spillovers of benefits or costs. Id. at 174.
130. Despite the relatively broad range of improvements for which special assessments are generally authorized, (see note 76 supra), their applicability is in fact quite
restricted since they are usually authorized only for the initial improvements and
not for maintenance. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. On the other hand,
since user charges are imposed on a consumption basis, they have a much greater
revenue-raising potential. These facts are reflected in local government revenue
figures. For example, in fiscal year 1967-68 total local government revenues from
current charges amounted to $6,894,000,000, while in the same period special assessments produced the relatively small sum of $366,000,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1967-68, cited in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS - SIGNIFICANT FEATURES, supra note 75, at 30.
131. See note 130 supra.
132. See, e.g., authorities cited note 116 supra. In addition to the revenue-raising
function of user charges, placing of municipal services on a quasi-pricing basis where
appropriate helps to encourage economical consumption. See J. DR TORREs, supra note
113, at 91.
133. Since service charges tend to be flat rates per unit of service, their effect is
generally regressive, burdening most heavily the lower income groups. However,
this need not necessarily be the case, for sometimes charges are differentiated or
even excused according to what economists call the "welfare," or ability to pay
principle. See G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 41. There is also the possibility that in
some communities the increased efficiency which results from the charge-financing of

certain services would reduce the total cost of providing such services and thus
benefit all residents, including those with low incomes. See Kafoglis, supra note 75,
at 184.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 3

VILLANOVA

B.

LAW REVIEW

Racial Classifications -

[VOL. 17

Benefit Financing

The issue of benefit financing as it relates to racial classifications
4
was raised in the pre-Hawkins case of Hadnott v. City of Prattville.1
However, it is submitted that in light of the holdings in Hawkins and
Serrano, the disposition of that issue in Hadnott requires re-examination.
The Hadnott case was a class action by the Negro residents of Prattville, Alabama, to enjoin city officials from continuing a long-standing
policy of providing municipal facilities on a discriminatory basis, and
to require the defendants to remedy the effects of their past discrimination.'8 5 The complaint was similar to the one in Hawkins; plaintiffs requested, inter alia, equalization in the areas of street paving, construction
of sidewalks and gutters, and installation of fire hydrants, sewerage lines,
street lights, street signs and traffic signs. Unlike Hawkins, all of these
services except the last three were traditionally provided by means of
special assessments, 8 6 but just as in Hawkins the statistical evidence revealed marked disparities along strictly racial lines,8 7 and there was an
admitted history of racial discrimination in distributing all municipal
services. 188 With respect to the services provided by means of special
assessments, the court concluded that there was no discrimination on the
basis of race because the Negro community had an equal opportunity to
petition (and pay) the city for the services, and the difference between
the conditions in black and white neighborhoods was thus due not to
discrimination but rather to the white landowners' greater "ability and
willingness to pay for the property improvements."' 8 9
134. 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
135. Hadnott, like Hawkins, was a class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. It appears, however, that plaintiffs' sole ground of complaint was

the equal protection clause. 309 F. Supp. at 972-73.
136. The services provided through special assessments were street paving and
the installation of sidewalks, gutters, sewers and water lines; and the inadequacy of
the water lines resulted in a lack of fire hydrants. 309 F. Supp. at 970-71.
137. 309 F. Supp. at 970. For example, in Prattville only approximately 3 per
cent of the white residents lived in homes which were located on unpaved streets,
while approximately 35 per cent of the black homes fronted on unpaved streets. Id.
138. Although it appeared that the city had traditionally practiced racial discrimination in the provision of its generally-funded services such as garbage collection,
street signs, street lights, traffic control signals and traffic control policemen, the
Hadnott court did not find any discrepancy at the time of trial because the city had
apparently equalized those services while the suit was pending. 309 F. Supp. at 969-71.
It should be noted, however, that such services tend to be relatively inexpensive to
provide, in contrast to the durable facilities which were foreclosed to the blacks
because they were benefit-financed.
139. 309 F. Supp. at 970. However, based on the evidence presented, the court
did find that the city had provided its public parks in a racially discriminatory
manner. It was held that the city had an obligation to take affirmative action to
desegregate all of its parks and to equalize the landscaping, equipment, cleaning and
supervision of the one park located in a Negro area. Id. at 973.
Plaintiffs also established that there was a racially discriminatory pattern of
employment in the fire and police departments. However, the court found no proof
that the employment discrimination had resulted in disparities of fire and police
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In the wake of Hawkins and Serrano, it appears that the Hadnott
court's treatment of the benefit financing issue as it relates to racial
classification may not have been correct. Following the Hawkins
140
approach,'
a statistical demonstration of substantial disparities between
services in black and white neighborhoods should create a prima facie
case of a suspect classification according to race, regardless of any
asserted justifications for the disparities. And as Serrano so strikingly
demonstrated, the financing methods used for the provision of government services are not immune from invalidation under strict scrutiny,
where such schemes contribute to a forbidden result.1 41 Indeed, the court
in Serrano aptly observed that "[olne must be ever aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination',"' 42 and if benefit financing is being employed in a manner
which results in a purely racial classification, it would seem that it is in
fact nothing more than a "sophisticated mode of discrimination."
It must be emphasized that in order to qualify under the Hawkins rule
the demonstrated disparities must establish a purely racial discrimination,
and not merely a "discrimination" which adversely affects all of the poor
in the muncipality as well as the racial minorities. 148 If the latter is the
case the classification is at most a classification according to wealth which
alone would not command strict scrutiny. 144 However, if the statistical
pattern in a community discloses a true racial classification, there is a
strong policy reason for the application of the Hawkins rule even if
benefit financing has contributed to the disparities.
Practically speaking, most statistical patterns of pure racial classification are found in the South. where a long history of educational and employment discrimination has resulted in a situation in which the blacks
occupy the lower income brackets more predominantly than in other
sections of the country. 45 It is a significant fact, therefore, that while the
property tax has always been the major source of local revenue in the
services in black and white neighborhoods, and it therefore issued no equalization
decree respecting those services. Id. at 974.
140. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
141. 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
142. Id. at 607 n.24, 487 P.2d at 1257 n.24, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.24, citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964), quoting from Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1939). Although the latter were reapportionment cases, the Serrano court
clearly considered the quoted observation relevant in cases involving financial plans
which potentially violate equal protection.
143. But see notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra. Absolute lines of racial
discrimination need not be shown; substantially racial disparities should be the test.
144. For a discussion of benefit financing resulting in wealth classifications in the
provision of basic municipal services, see notes 152-68 and accompanying text infra.
145. The extreme degree of racial discrimination historically practiced in the
South is still reflected in the poverty statistics for that region. These statistics show
that as of 1969 approximately 40 per cent of the black families in the South had an
income of under $4,000, while the national poverty rate thus defined was less than 15
per cent for all races combined. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 505, at 318 (1971).
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overwhelming majority of municipalities,' 146 benefit financing by means
of special assessments and user charges is the dominant form of local
financing in many communities in the South. 147 This situation, and the
resultant non-servicing of black neighborhoods, has arisen because historically the blacks were denied the right to vote,' 48 and therefore the
whites could elect to finance municipal services by the method which
would assure them of maximum individual benefits with virtually no
redistributional "drawbacks.' 49 Against this background it is apparent
that where a disparity in services exists along purely racial lines, the
effect of a benefit financing policy is truly to "freeze in" the results of
past discrimination -

the very effect condemned in Hawkins'5"

-

and

such discrimination should not be permitted to persist. 51'
C.

Wealth Classifications -

Benefit Financing

The problem of wealth classifications resulting from the benefit
financing of municipal services is a difficult one because special assessments and user charges are types of public pricing mechanisms, and a
pricing mechanism by its very nature discriminates at least in part on
the basis of wealth. 15 2 Nevertheless in many areas, especially large cities,
distinct racial minorities are a part of a broader group of low income
residents who have traditionally received inadequate municipal services, 53
and benefit financing of some of those services may have been a contrib146. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
147. See Kafoglis, supra note 75, at 164.
148. See, e.g., note 60 supra (description of the voting progress of Negroes in
Shaw, Mississippi).
149. The allocative (i.e., non-redistributional) effect of benefit financing is one of
its chief advantages from the (non-poor) "consumer's" point of view. See note 127
and accompanying text supra.
150. See text accompanying note 51 supra. Although the problem of strictly
racial discrimination is somewhat less prevalent outside the South, the above reasoning would be equally applicable wherever such a pattern exists.
151. Unlike in cases of wealth discrimination (see pp. 667-76 supra and
pp. 683-85 infra), in a case of racial discrimination resulting from benefit financing the defense of municipal financial limitations should be singularly unconvincing. This is so because such a pattern reflects a political decision on the part
of the white residents of the community not only to provide only themselves with
certain basic amenities of urban living, but also to spend much of the tax budget,
which should be spent for the general welfare, on the maintenance of those privatelyenjoyed facilities. See notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text supra. Thus, in
starving the municipal budget by relying heavily on benefit financing, the politically
more powerful residents ensure first, that there is not enough public money with
which to originally install needed facilities in black neighborhoods, and secondly,
that a large proportion of whatever general funds are collected will never be redistributed for the general good, but will instead be spent solely for the further benefit
of the privileged group. See notes 167 & 168 and accompanying text infra.
152. The general rule of pricing is that any good can be sold if there is some
means of excluding some of the consumers. Kafoglis, supra note 75, at 166. Having
thus limited the supply of the commodity a seller can fix his price, and consumers
will theoretically purchase the commodity in such quantities as they desire and can
afford (i.e., up to the point of maximum marginal utility). Id.
153. See note 61 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss4/3

28

Little: Potholes, Lampposts and Policemen: Equal Protection and the Finan

MARCH

1972]

COMMENTS

683

uting factor in the creation of the inadequacies. The question remains,
however, whether equal protection provides a remedy in such a situation.
It would seem that if fire and police protection are fundamental interests, as suggested above, 54 they may not be provided in a manner
which is discriminatory according to wealth, and therefore may not be
charge-financed. The soundness of this conclusion is borne out by the
fact that these two services are never provided by local governments on
the pricing principle. 155 For this reason, however, such a rule would
apparently have little applicability at the present time. 15 6 Nevertheless, should local governments decide to provide fire and police protection
on an ability-to-pay basis, strict scrutiny should then be applicable to
prevent such an action.
Since strict scrutiny is probably not available with respect to necessary municipal services other than education, fire and police protection,'Sl
the courts could apply the traditional test in considering such services and
uphold a benefit financing scheme which results in a wealth classification
on the basis of any conceivable justification advanced by the government.
A better approach, however, would be to use the unweighted balancing
test,'1 58 especially where several services are unequal or lacking due to
benefit financing, thus contributing to an overall picture of inadequacy.
Under such a test, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate a wealth
classification in the distribution of necessary municipal services, and prove
the severity of the detriment to them and their families from the deprivation or unequal provision of such services. The state would then be
required to show that important governmental interests outweighed the
interests asserted by the plaintiffs. Although in many cases the government's burden could be sustained by demonstrating the fiscal conditions
under which it was operating and the advisability of using benefit financing for the enumerated services, 1' 9 the defendants would at least be put
to the proof of their allegations since the presumption in favor of the
government does not obtain under the unweighted balancing test.
According to the economic theory underlying benefit financing there
are only certain situations in which this system is appropriate, and these
elementary rules should be relevant in evaluating the defendants' asserted
justifications for adopting such financing for the basic municipal services.
The first rule concerns the incidence of the benefit of governmental services. If a service yields primarily private benefits, i.e., it has no significant
collective or "spillover" benefits affecting the whole community, the
154. See pp. 669-73 supra.
155. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
156. One area where such a rule might be presently applicable is in the provision
of water conduits by means of special assessments, since water pressure is a component of fire protection. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
157. See
158. For
applying the
159. See

notes 76, 77 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Marshall's precise formulation of the factors to be considered in
unweighted test, see p. 675 supra.
notes 112-33 and accompanying text supra.
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service may be fully financed by means of charges.' 60 Examples are the
services often provided by means of privately-owned public utilities such
as electricity, gas and transportation, Some governmental services, on
the other hand, produce both individual benefits and significant "spillover" benefits to society. Examples would be education and sanitation
services. While these services need not be financed by charges at all,
if they are they may not be financed entirely on a benefit principle, because such a scheme would unduly restrict consumption of a service in
which the government has a proper interest in encouraging consumption. 16'
In other words, when there are significant "spillover" benefits, service
charges are either usable only in part, or not at all. Moreover, the usual
reason for imposing partial charges in such cases is not primarily to
supplement government revenues but to prevent excessive consumption
and waste, 16 2 as in the case of imposing moderate charges for street
cleaning in order to discourage littering. Finally, there are those services
which are consumed collectively by the entire community. Such services
can be financed only through taxation because their benefits cannot be
limited to those who have paid for them. 16 3 The classic example of a
collective service is national defense. At the municipal level, it would
appear that a city-wide air pollution control effort would constitute a
collective good which could not therefore be financed by charges or
special assessments. In sum, if a local government imposes charges in
whole or in part where they are not economically justified, the mere
showing of fiscal hardship should not be sufficient to sustain the government's burden under the unweighted balancing test.
Another important limitation on the use of benefit financing is that
a service which provides individual benefits but is also necessary to the
community at large can only be charge-financed when the users show
at least inferential ability to pay the charge. 64 Such is the case on a
rcgional level with toll financing of highways; the ability to pay the toll
is inferred from the fact of automobile ownership and ability to purchase fuel. In contrast, if the individual recipients of a communityessential service do not evidence the ability to pay, economic theory
dictates that the service must be provided free of charge and financed
out of general revenues.' 65 In the case of education, for example, no inference of ability to pay can be drawn from the fact of having children,
so since education is a community-essential service it is provided without cost. With regard to other basic municipal services such as sewerage,
drainage and garbage collection, which in almost all urbanized areas are
essential to the community, it would appear that the government would
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See, e.g., J. DE TORRES, supra note 113, at 91-92.
Id. at 88-90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 88.
See G. BOYLE, supra note 76, at 16.
Id.
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be obliged to have at least inquired into the relationship between the
intended level of charges and the recipients' potential ability to afford
such charges. 166
A final factor which might be considered in evaluating the municipality's choice of benefit financing under an unweighted equal protection balancing test is the percentage of government subsidy involved
10 7
in providing a partially charge-financed service. As noted previously,
the majority of charge-financed services involve heavy tax subsidies in
addition to the amounts exacted as service charges or special assessments.
While this "joint enterprise" type of financing has many advantages
when properly implemented, there is a point along the range of public/
private expenditure ratios at which the amount charged would be so
miniscule in proportion to the amount of subsidy that there would be
no adequate governmental justification for imposing charges at all,
since the charge would in effect create a "closed circle" of affluent citizens receiving large amounts of general tax benefits which were denied
to the poor because they could not afford to pay the "initiation fee."
At such a point the government could not convincingly assert that the
amount of the charges collected was necessary to finance the service
despite the small proportion of total cost which it represented, because
it could be demonstrated that elimination of the charge would only result in a very minor overall reduction in the adequacy of the service.'6 8
V. THE PROBLEM OF

"BACKLASH"

When a municipality which has provided its services through general revenues, but in a manner discriminatory according to race or
wealth, learns that it may be required to equalize those services, the
question arises whether the city can or should switch to some form of
166. For example, Boyle postulated in his article that at the 1954 rate of local
government spending if all sewerage expenditures were charge-financed rather than
tax-financed, the charges would not be appreciably greater than the tax burden for
the same services for, e.g., families with incomes between $2,000 and $7,500; and that
neither financing method would cost such families more than .3 per cent of their
income. However, the gap between the costs of the two financing methods widened
drastically when education was considered. For families having incomes between
$4,000 and $4,999, tax financing of education at that time required only 1.3 per cent
and 1.9 per cent of income, respectively; but if charge financing were used instead, a
family in that income bracket having six children would be forced to spend 8.0 per
cent of its income on education. This level of charge financing would violate the
"ability
to pay" principle. The author's conclusion was that extended use of service

charges for increasing varieties of municipal services would require continued consideration of the factor of ability to pay. Id. at 45-47.

167. See notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text supra.
168. For example, the amount of user charges collected for a "charge-financed"
service has generally represented between 30 per cent and 75 per cent of the costs of
providing that service. See note 129 supra. It would appear that if charges or special
assessments were to drop to around the 10 per cent mark, where the service was
thus at least 90 per cent subsidized out of general tax revenues, the de minimus
point would be reached because without benefit financing the government could still
provide the service at 90 per cent of the "charge-financed" level of adequacy.
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benefit financing in order to avoid such a ruling. As shown above, 169
local governments generally have considerable legal authority to take
such action. If a municipality were to do so in the face of a Hawkins or
Serrano-type equalization order, it is clear that it could be stopped im170
mediately by means of the courts' contempt power.
If a municipality decided to change to benefit financing in anticipation of an equalization order, assuming no court action had yet commenced, the equal protection consequences should depend upon the nature
of the classification and the nature of the services involved, as discussed
above. 17 1 A claim of racial discrimination, therefore, should still command strict scrutiny.' 72 A similar consequence should follow if the resulting wealth classification affected fundamental interests, arguably fire
and police protection as well as education.173 If a wealth classification
in furnishing lesser municipal services resulted, it might well be upheld
under the unweighted balancing test 74 in the interest of permitting local
governments to use the most efficient means of distributing their varied
services and in the interest of permitting experimentation toward that
end. However, to meet the standards of an unweighted balancing test
the government should be obliged to demand more than a de minimus
contribution from its "customers,"' 75 and if so it would have to weigh
the disadvantages of increasing the municipal "cost of living" against the
disadvantages of being required to equalize services provided out of
general revenues and thus, predictably, suffering a loss in the overall
176
quality of services which could be provided.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Comment has attempted to explore the equal protection avenues which may be open to litigants who desire to remedy the inequalities in basic municipal services which exist in their communities. It
has been postulated that while the equal protection considerations vary
169. See notes 76 & 123 and accompanying text supra.
170. See generally Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1.
171. See pp. 680-85 supra.
172. See notes 134-51 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 154-56 and accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 167 & 168 and accompanying text supra.
176. One of the greatest inhibiting factors upon local government revenue increases is the fact that most local governments are engaged in a struggle to maintain
"competitive" tax (and charge) positions in their region:
Local policymakers competing in a metropolitan arena are keenly sensitive to
inter-community tax rate differentials. There is a constant fear that an above
average tax rate will act as a powerful deterrent to economic development within
the local jurisdiction.
Because of the desire to "stay in line," the relatively low level of taxation
that is possible in the more affluent jurisdictions tends to serve as a brake on
higher taxes throughout the metropolitan area ... despite the fact that higher
taxes may be urgently needed in other jurisdictions.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 112, at 13.
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depending upon whether the inequalities are along the lines of race or
wealth, and whether the services are financed completely out of tax
revenues or are financed in whole or in part by means of special assessments or user charges, there are strong indications that equal protection
can and should provide a ground for relief. While additional grounds
may also be available in certain limited situations, 177 it appears that
equal protection is the preferable approach in most instances. Therefore it is hoped that the suggestions made herein will further the development of appropriate equal protection standards for municipal
services - standards which give due regard to the vital personal and
governmental interests at stake in each type of case.
Mary Bowen Little
177. See Abascal, supra note 12, at 1370-74, (suggesting the common law theories

of abuse of discretion and the public utility doctrine, as well as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970)).; Note, supra note 58, at 756-61
(proposing a theory of fiduciary duty in the provision of municipal services).
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